IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Disability Rights Section (NYA)
U.S. Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. – NYA
Washington, DC  20530

Plaintiff,

v.

WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA
TRANSIT AUTHORITY,
600 Fifth St., N.W.
Washington, DC  20001

Defendant.

 

 

COMPLAINT
Jury Trial Demanded

Civ. Case No.

 

COMPLAINT

Plaintiff, the United States of America, respectfully alleges:

  1. This action is brought by the United States of America against the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (“WMATA”) to enforce the statutory and regulatory provisions of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12111-12117, which incorporate, through 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a), the powers, remedies, and procedures set forth in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, included in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.  As set forth below, the United States alleges that WMATA subjected Mr. Bennie Vaughan to unlawful discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of the ADA.
  2. The Court has jurisdiction over this action under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a), and 1345.
  3. The Court has authority to grant a declaratory judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (and related relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2202), and authority to grant equitable relief and monetary damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a).
  4. Venue is proper in this district under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f).  Venue is also proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because the Defendant is located in this district and a substantial part of the claims or omissions giving rise to this Complaint occurred in this district.
  5. Plaintiff is the United States of America.  Defendant is the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority.  WMATA is an interstate compact agency and, by the terms of its enabling legislation, an agency and instrumentality of the District of Columbia, State of Maryland, and Commonwealth of Virginia.  It is headquartered in Washington, District of Columbia.
  6. Defendant is a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 12111(7) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a).
  7. Defendant is an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
  8. Defendant is a covered entity within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2) and 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(b).
  9. At all relevant times, Mr. Bennie Vaughan was an adult resident of the State of Maryland.  Mr. Vaughan has epilepsy, a seizure disorder.  From time to time, Mr. Vaughan experiences “absence seizures” which cause him to cease action and stare uncontrollably for a brief time.  Mr. Vaughan controls this disability through medication and responsible lifestyle choices, but his condition is incurable.  He is disabled within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) because his seizure disorder substantially limits one or more major life activities, including the operation of his neurological system.  He has a record of such a disability and WMATA regarded him as having such a disability.
  10. On or about May 13, 2013, Mr. Vaughan applied for the open position of Elevator/Escalator (“ELES”) Parts Supervisor with WMATA.
  11. On or about May 21, 2013, through a letter, WMATA extended to Mr. Vaughan a provisional offer of employment for the ELES Parts Supervisor position.  The offer was contingent upon Mr. Vaughan’s successful completion of a medical examination.
  12. Mr. Vaughan was a qualified individual within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) for the ELES Parts Supervisor position because he could perform the essential functions of that position with or without an accommodation.
  13. Mr. Vaughan submitted to a medical examination and the results were sent to WMATA.  WMATA received those results on or about May 31, 2013.  Those results indicated that Mr. Vaughan has epilepsy.
  14. On or about June 26, 2013, Mr. Vaughan received a letter from WMATA indicating that it had rescinded his provisional offer of employment due to his medical condition.
  15. On or about July 2, 2013, Mr. Vaughan sent a letter to WMATA in which he asked for the specific reason for his disqualification.
  16. On or about July 8, 2013, a WMATA employee asked Mr. Vaughan to submit additional medical records to WMATA.
  17. On or about September 6, 2013, Mr. Vaughan submitted additional medical records to WMATA.
  18. On or about October 24, 2013, a WMATA employee contacted Mr. Vaughan and told him that he would not be hired for the ELES Parts Supervisor Position.
  19. On or about October 28, 2013, Mr. Vaughan sent a letter to WMATA asking for written confirmation that he would not be hired.
  20. On or about November 4, 2013, WMATA sent Mr. Vaughan a letter indicating that he would not be hired due to his seizure disorder.
  21. The position of ELES Parts Supervisor remained open, and WMATA continued to seek applications from people of similar qualifications.
  22. On or about April 19, 2014, Mr. Vaughan filed a timely claim against WMATA with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), stating that WMATA had violated the ADA when it failed to hire him for the ELES Parts Supervisor position.
  23. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, incorporated by reference in 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a), the EEOC investigated Mr. Vaughan’s claim.  On or about March 10, 2015, the EEOC issued a Determination stating that there was reasonable cause to believe that WMATA had failed to hire Mr. Vaughan based on his disability, in violation of the ADA.  After unsuccessfully attempting to reach a voluntary resolution of the charge, the EEOC referred the matter to the United States Department of Justice.

CAUSE OF ACTION

  1. The allegations of the foregoing paragraphs are hereby incorporated by reference.
  2. Title I of the ADA prohibits covered entities from discriminating against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to application procedures, hiring, and other terms, conditions, and procedures of employment.  42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
  3. Title I of the ADA requires covered entities to engage job applicants with known disabilities in an interactive process to assess the nature of the disability and how the employer might reasonably accommodate that disability, where the employer believes that the disability might prevent the applicant from performing an essential job function.  42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3).
  4. WMATA’s conduct as described in this Complaint constitutes discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of Title I of ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117, including the following ways:
    1. WMATA failed to engage Mr. Vaughan in an interactive process concerning the essential job functions of the position, Mr. Vaughan’s ability to perform those functions, and the possibility of accommodations for Mr. Vaughan’s disability, despite the fact that he is a qualified person with a disability who could perform the essential functions of the position, with or without accommodation, in violation of Title I of the ADA.  See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 and 29 C.F.R. Part 1630;
    2. WMATA failed to hire Mr. Vaughan due to his disability, record of disability, or regarding him as disabled, despite the fact that he is a qualified person with a disability who could perform the essential functions of the position, with or without accommodation, in violation of Title I of the ADA.  See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 and 29 C.F.R. Part 1630.
  5. As a consequence of WMATA’s discriminatory conduct, Mr. Vaughan has suffered and continues to suffer harms, including emotional distress, lost income, lost benefits, mental anguish, pain and suffering, anxiety, depression, loss of enjoyment of life, and humiliation.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, the United States prays that this Court:

  1. Grant judgment in favor of the United States and declare that WMATA has violated Title I of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117, and its accompanying regulations;
  2. Enjoin WMATA and its agents, employees, successors, and all persons in active concert or participation with it, from engaging in discriminatory employment policies and practices against individuals based on disability;
  3. Require WMATA to engage job applicants with disabilities in an interactive process wherein the parties discuss essential job functions that might be affected by the applicant’s disability, and how the applicant’s disability might be accommodated;
  4. Require WMATA to modify its policies, practices, and procedures as necessary to comply with Title I of the ADA and its accompanying regulations;
  5. Enjoin WMATA from failing or refusing to take other appropriate nondiscriminatory measures to overcome the effects of any discriminatory policies and practices;
  6. Award Mr. Vaughan compensatory damages in appropriate amount for injuries suffered as a result of WMATA’s failure to comply with the requirements of Title I of the ADA;
  7. Require WMATA to train its supervisors and medical examiners regarding the requirements of the ADA as well as WMATA’s policies for implementing those requirements; and
  8. Order such other appropriate relief as the interests of justice require.

JURY DEMAND

Plaintiff United States requests a trial by jury.

Respectfully submitted this 13th day of January, 2017.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
LORETTA E. LYNCH
Attorney General of the United States

VANITA GUPTA
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General

EVE L. HILL
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division

REBECCA B. BOND
Chief
KEVIN KIJEWSKI
Deputy Chief
Disability Rights Section

/s/

DOUGLAS KERN
OH Bar No. 72864
Trial Attorney
Disability Rights Section (NYA)
U.S. Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. – NYA
Washington, DC  20530
(202) 307-0063 (office)
(202) 305-4486 (fax)
doug.kern@usdoj.gov

Counsel for Plaintiff
United States of America

 CHANNING D. PHILLIPS
D.C. BAR #415793
United States Attorney

DANIEL F. VAN HORN
D.C. BAR #924092
Chief, Civil Division

/s/
JOHN C. TRUONG
D.C. BAR #465901
Assistant United States Attorney
555 4th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530
Tel: (202) 252-2524
Fax: (202) 252-2599
E-mail: john.truong@usdoj.gov

Counsel for Plaintiff
United States of America